This book begins with an examination of the "new" terrorism, referencing such diverse terrorist groups as Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, American Militias, and narco-terrorist organizations. The final chapter covers how to counter the new terrorism.

This book, written in 1999, seems nothing short of prescient! On page 88 it says, "Until recent years, however, few of these [terrorist] attacks took place within the United States, partly because traditional terrorist groups found the prospect of operations in the United States too difficult, politically counterproductive, or simply unnecessary. Most observers now believe the threshold for significant international terrorism in the United States has been crossed..."

If you are interested in understanding the new terrorism and the steps that need to be taken to counter it, or if you wish to understand the plans that are possibly being constructed by the United States government, then I cannot recommend this book enough. It gives the reader an excellent grasp of how new terrorist organizations are organized, how they work, how to fight them, and where future threats are likely to come from.

Buy this book!


Solid study on changing patterns of terrorism   January 19, 2002
 2 out of 2 found this review helpful

This book offers a very solid study of terrorism and what can be done about it, which will appeal predominantly to the specialist. It is a compilation of a number of RAND studies looking at the changing nature and challenges of terrorism, how best to meet the threats, and the strategic implications thrown up. Although RAND is a federally funded think tank for the US Air Force, and tends therefore to take an air orientated view of things, there is a considerable amount of general analysis and insight in this book - published in 1999 - which has so far stood the test of time despite the attacks of 11 September.

A number of key issues are thrown up by the RAND work which are well highlighted in the studies. These include the decrease in the number of attacks but their increasing lethality, the growing importance of the ethno-religious dimension in terrorism as it takes over from the ideological and nationalist terrorists of the 20th Century as the main threat, and the problems of dealing with a new generation of terrorists that are working more in networks than in traditional hierarchical cell structures. (Al-Qaeda is a particularly good example of this last trend.) This leads RAND to advocate the use of the "netwar" concept to deal with such a difficult and diffuse threat. The most interesting conclusion, especially coming from an American perspective, is that terrorism cannot be defeated; the best thing we can expect is containment.

This book will appeal more to the policy maker, planner and specialist, but has much of interest that will appeal to the general reader who wants a more detailed exposition of what to do about the terrorist threat.