Customer Reviews:
 A Must for those Heading to the Sand Pit March 20, 2008
0 out of 2 found this review helpful
John Nagl's book is simply a must for those heading to the sand pit and includes a great deal of insights into the workings of the British and American army's.
John Nagl incliudes his own aspect of Argyris and Schon's double loop learning system based on Ashby's previous work and fits the learning cycle into the military system in order to discover what is a successful learning organisation.
It is interesting to review the American surge with the failure of Britain's army to secure Basra after reading this book and learning more about organisational learning.
Importantly, it is also easy and interesting to read!!
The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) December 24, 2007
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Colonel Nagl's book is an excellent study though inevitably is bears traces of its original existence as a Oxford University doctoral study.
I have no problem with the Vietnam section but in regard to what Colonel Nagl has written about the Malayan Emergency, the argument is advanced that the army was running the intelligence behind the counterinsurgency
operations. However, the supreme intelligence agency was the Malayan Police Special Branch which was responsibile for political, security and
operational intelligence. The army did not run its own agents and General Templer, the British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made it quite clear on several occasions that the Special Branch was the supreme intelligence organisation. Although indeed some 30 or so military intelligence officers were eventually (around 1952) attached to the Special Branch, they were not in charge of intelligence, and they acted under the direction of the senior Special Branch officer to whom they were attached. Their role was limited to passing on operational intelligence obtained by the Special Branch to the army in a form that the army could readily understand. The reader should therefore bear this important qualification in mind in reading Colonel Nagl's otherwise commendable contribution to counterinsurgency warfare.
 Not What I Expected July 20, 2007
4 out of 4 found this review helpful
This book has received a number of 'must read' reviews in a number of publications - several of them military in-house magazines. I think some of those reviews are overstated now that I have had the benefit of reading the book. In particular the subtitle 'Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam' is misleading.
Once I opened the book and understood that the main thrust was a study of organisational behaviour then it became clear to me that the author had researched the subject well and presented his arguments effectively and most impressively, as a serving US Army officer, made some critical statements regarding his employer.
For anybody seeking an in-depth analysis of the Malayan Emergency or the Vietnam War, or even a primer on counter-insurgency, this is not the book for you. If, however, you have slightly more than a passing knowledge of both the British and US Armies and the two conflicts, then this book offers well-argued and courageous insights and I recommend it on this basis.
 A well written and intelligent book June 19, 2006
6 out of 9 found this review helpful
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is a well written book by an author who has a good deal of experience in field on which he writes. The book itself sometimes reads as you might expect a university thesis to. To some this might seem distracting, but actually accentuates the amount of excellent research carried out by John Nagl. It is, in fact, a very readable book which those who read it will find intellectually stimulating as well as interesting. For those in the armed forces whose jobs relate to counter-insurgency this book is well worth the time spent reading it.
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