Clausewitz was born into a middle-class family in Prussia in the late 18th Century. His father, not being a noble, was unable to retain his provisional officer rank of lieutenant he had achieved during the Seven Years War (known as the French and Indian War in the North American theater of operations). Thus a subtext of Clausewitz and his family's dubious pretentions to nobility that were finally "recognized" in the wake of his own and to a lesser extent his brother's-who also became a lesser known general-achievements.

Clausewitz and his older brother were farmed out to the military by their father in 1792 when Clausewitz was 12 years old as officer cadets during the Wars of the French Revolution and he served in the military throughout the entire Napoleonic period and thereafter rising to the rank of major general. It was this highly charged political atmosphere that conditioned Clausewitz' world view and made him-along with his mentor Gerhard Scharnhorst-realize that the old set piece notions of war which played out like a chess game held in a gentleman's club between rival aristocratic principalities were no longer viable. It also gave added fuel to his and the other "reformers" views that certain social changes were needed to neutralize the appeal of the French Revolution. Thus they called for the scaling back of aristocratic privilege and the building of a military based on broader nationalist and meritocratic bases. They also emphasized, ironically given the reputation of mindless obedience that Prussian militarism retained, the importance of inculcating troops with a spirit of self reliance which involved de-emphasizing dogma and promoting analytical thinking that could form the basis for decision making in unforseen circumstances of crisis. These ideas took on greater urgency after Prussia's stunning and swift defeat at the hands of Napolean in 1806 in a few weeks of fighting (when Clausewitz was taken prisoner and actually was granted an audience with the French Emperor)- a situation that ironically suggests the fate of France of 1940, but this in the era of horse cavalry!-resulting in Napolean and the Grand Armee marching triumphantly through the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. As a result Prussia was for a number of years reduced to a virtual vassal state of France, not unlike what Vichy France was to Germany a century and half later, and when war broke out again in 1812 it was forced to take the side of Napolean. This was deeply offensive to patriotic and nationalist advocates like Scharnhorst, Clausewitz and others like Field Marshal Gneisenau and ultimately Clausewitz decamped to Russia where he became involved with the "Russo-German Legion" which after Napoleon's reverses there was able to first convince the Prussian commander Yorck to switch sides and then Prussia-like Italy in WW2-to do the same. Clausewitz then went with the "Allied" armies all the way to Paris and thereafter fought in a rear guard action at Waterloo.

The sweetness of this victory for him and others (Sharnhorst having died on the field of battle in 1813) was muted by the extreme reactionary turn of the victors towards resurrecting old time aristocratic and monarchical privilege, something Clauswitz from his vantage point of a military instructor in Berlin saw as holding back both Prussia and Germany's social and political development internally towards becoming a modern nation state and only adding fuel to the fire of discontent throughout Europe. Moreover, his reputation as a bourgois, if not "liberal", reformer caused his career to stall. It was in this context, that returned to line duty, he died of cholera while observing the events of the revolution of 1830 in Poland.

The book's shortcoming is its dense style which makes its ideas less accessible than they could be. Moreover, the ideas of its subject could be elucidated better; the author relies too heavily on extended quotations from his subject's work. For example, an entire chapter of On War is reproduced with little gloss.

After having read this book, I saw a documentary about James Cameron's recent mission to the wreck of the battleship Bismarck and was able to appreciate its references to two of the heavy cruisers in that great warship's battle group: Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Finally, for what it's worth, we can speculate about what Clausewitz' view of later German military history might have been, but one conclusion seems inescapable: he would have found Hitler's invasion of Russia a collosal blunder breathtaking in its ingnorance of the lessons of history which resulted in a similar outcome that snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.


The Real Clausewitz   July 6, 2000
 3 out of 4 found this review helpful

Clausewitz was not a god of war, nor an advocate of the waging of war for war's, or conquest's, sake. He was a thoughtful, experienced soldier who saw much service, wrote about his experiences and tried to improve the armed forces of his country, Prussia.

This exceptional book by Peter Paret not only gives interesting information on Clausewitz the soldier and the man, but also explains the interesting enigma that was Prussia before, during, and after the Napoleonic Wars. This is not a companion book to anything, but a well-researched volume that stands on its own as authoritative history.

Paret goes into detail on why Prussia was defeated, and its army destroyed by Napoleon in the cataclysm of 1806. Conversely, the thoughtful, professional soldiers who sought to rebuild that army, 'with vengeance very much in mind' are developed to the extent that they are perceived as human without the false front of a textbook.

Excellently reserarched from original sources and credible secondary ones, Paret also goes in depth to cover the Prussian 'War of Liberation' of Germany from the French, the liberation in large part meaning annexation by Prussia. Additionally, he also explains that the Prussian civilian population, somewhat a thing apart from the Prussian army, was persuaded, by force if necessary, to participate in the wars in 1813-1814.

This book goes a long way into explaining Clausewitz and his times, is worth favorable, consideration, and belongs on the bookshelf of every thoughtful student.


Provides an excellent start to the study of Clausewitz   February 19, 1999
 4 out of 4 found this review helpful

Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln. That one line from Carl von Clausewitz's most famous work, On War, is the most often quoted and perhaps most misunderstood concept that belongs to the Prussian officer's theory of war. Clausewitz's ideas are complex and his writings require study and contemplation to understand, but for those who invest the time and effort the results will be that your view of war will change forever. Professor Paret's book provides a helpful aide to this understanding. While Clausewitz and the State is not light reading and a background in German or at least Napoleanic history is helpful, this book provides the basis for developing a fuller understanding of Clausewitz and his concepts. The Clausewitz that Paret introduces is hardly the stereotype Prussian marinet. He's a reformer and distinctly modern in his outlook. A career officer who joined a line regiment as a cadet at 12, saw his first action at 14 and rose to the rank of Major General, yet wrote of the profound sorrow he felt upon leaving home at such a tender age, Clausewitz put his sense of duty to the state, and by extension the Prussian people, before his duty to the monarch. Branded a radical his career suffered, but he remained true to his convictions. The General Staff officers of the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler can trace the roots of their decision to him. This book provides an excellent base from which to start in understanding the thoughts of this trully novel thinker. I also recommend a visit to the Clausewitz Page on the web. Read this book before you attempt to take on On War.